Firm ownership structure impact on corporate social responsibility: evidence from austerity U.K. by Elgergeni, Siham et al.
Page 1 of 41 
 
Title:   Firm ownership structure impact on Corporate Social   
   Responsibility: Evidence from austerity U.K. 
 
Ms. Siham Elgergeni, Lecturer in Financial Management, Northampton Business School, University of 
Northampton, Park campus, C108, Boughton Green road, Northampton, NN2 7AL, United Kingdom, Email: 
siham.elgergeni2@Northampton.ac.uk 
Dr. Nadeem Khan*, Lecturer in Governance, Policy and Leadership, Room 501, Engine House, Greenlands 
campus, Henley Business School, UoR, Henley on Thames, Oxfordshire RG9 3AU, U.K. Email: 
nadeem.khan@henley.ac.uk 
Prof. Nada K. Kakabadse, Professor of Policy, Governance and Ethics, Room 500, Engine House, Greenlands 
campus, Henley Business School, UoR, Henley on Thames, Oxfordshire RG9 3AU, U.K., Email: 
n.kakabadse@henley.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
Corporate social responsibility has become an increasingly important sustainable 
development issue in U.K. The main contribution of this study is to examine how firm 
ownership structure impacts good corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in 
U.K. during austerity conditions. Following the financial crisis of 2007/8 the U.K. 
government introduced austerity conditions which impacted firm CSR activities. From the 
initial sample of more than 250 firms, fifty consistently remain listed on the FTSE4good 
index during 2008-2012 and are analysed. The definition of CSR distinguishes voluntary and 
mandatory CSR construct (Arora and Dharwadkhar, 2011). Findings indicate Board 
ownership structure and satisfactory firm performance impact on the level of voluntary CSR. 
Board ownership results suggest increased institutional and non-CEO shareholdings support a 
higher level of voluntary CSR engagement, whilst increased CEO shareholdings lead to a 
lower level of investment in voluntary CSR. In terms of satisfactory firm performance, results 
suggest positive attainment discrepancy supports a higher level of voluntary CSR, whereas 
greater potential organizational slack leads to a lower level of voluntary CSR investment. 
Effective governance and voluntary CSR association is more pronounced under conditions of 
high attainment discrepancy and low organizational slack. The findings suggest implications 
for adapting firm decision-making latitude and government policy between austerity and 
prosperity conditions. 
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Introduction 
The focus of corporate governance mechanisms has traditionally prioritised the maximizing 
of shareholders economic value (Freidman, 1962; Williamson, 1975; Kakabadse et al., 2013) 
more than environmental protection and social sustainability. Within the originating 
economies of Anglo-American capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Aguliera and Crespi-
Cladera, 2015) progressive governments' increasingly neo-liberal financial policies 
(Kinderman, 2012; Heyes et al., 2012) as innovations, have supported the rapid growth of an 
elite cadre of corporate entities (Vitali et al., 2011). Concern about the management of finite 
world resources by these leading firms and their impact on societies is driving the sustainable 
development trajectory (WCED, 1987; Casula Vifell and Soneryd, 2012) through greater 
prominence of discretionary firm corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities (Carroll, 
1991). This broadens the fiercely contested debates concerning managerial discretion (Berle 
and Means, 1932) and monitoring by owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) researched within 
and across academic, economic, behavioural, environmental and legal fields to integrate 
environmental and social well-being decision-making as sustainable development 
accountability of the firm. 
 
Regardless, the intensifying regularity of corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, 
Parmalat, Lehmans, BP, Barclays, VW, Rolls Royce, Tesco (Filho and Balassiano, 2008; 
Neal and Cochran, 2008, Utz, 2017) has impacted governments that are out of kilter(Ireland, 
Greece, Spain)and firm control within industries (Knyght et al., 2011, Martínez‐Ferrero, and 
Frías‐Aceituno, 2015). In advanced stable economies, the governance attention has shifted 
towards maturing environmental (E.U. Emission trading scheme,2005;EPI, 2014) and social 
Page 3 of 41 
 
indices (FTSE4Good, 2001;Dow Jones sustainability index, 1999). As such, corporate 
performance (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Al‐Najjar, and Anfimiadou, 2012) is these days, a more valued outcome of CSR 
activities (Carroll, 1999; 2008;Amran, Lee, and Devi,2014; Calza, Profuma and Tutore, 
2016) which are the critical focus of mature boards' sustainability priorities (Helfaya, and 
Moussa,. 2017; Kakabadse et al., 2009; Khan and Kakabadse 2014). 
 
Some studies have examined the relationship of CSR with firm financial (Margolis and 
Walsh, 2003) and social performance (Rehbein, Waddock and Graves, 2004) or towards its 
assessment in a national context (Skouloudis and Evangelinos, 2012). These elements are of 
equal importance because businesses exist in and are inter-dependent on society. (McKelvey, 
1999). As such, CSR constructs have to equitably promote environmental, social and 
economic issues for better sustainability judgements and outcomes (Bondy et al., 2012). We 
note here, a distinction to environment and social issues being understood for firm financial 
performance! Our contribution tries to be sensitive to how each firm uniquely embeds CSR as 
equitable construct and to the influence a national context can have on them (Killic et al. 
2015). 
 
More particularly, the existing research into firm ownership and CSR is relatively sparse 
(Cormier and Gordon, 2001). Few studies have examined the relationship of firm ownership 
structure with specific elements e.g. climate change mitigation (Amran et al., 2014). In 
advanced markets, institutional ownership influence dominates the leading listed firms. Some 
scholars assert that dominant institutional owners focus their attention on shorter term goals, 
that often disregard CSR as a longer term goal (Coffey and Frixell, 1991). Other scholars 
argue institutional investors are unable to leave the firm early and therefore, they prioritise 
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mitigation of risk and stronger compliance or disclosure (Neubam and Zahra, 2006). Our 
contribution is novel in how we integrate the equitable factors that define CSR and uniquely 
draw attention to voluntary board behaviours (CEO/non-CEO) as complimentary, yet critical 
to mandatory compliance (Arora and Dharwadkha, 2011) for listed firms, which is 
pronounced during austerity conditions. 
 
This paper contributes to a research gap examining CSR and firm ownership under emergent 
austerity conditions. The focus is on understanding how ownership structure influences the 
decision to invest in CSR activities (Prado-Lorenzo et al.,2009;Oh et al., 2011;Dam and 
Scholtens, 2012;Ali, Frynas and Mahmood, 2017; Lopatta, Jaeschke and Chen, 2017) by 
U.K. based corporations, where CEO and non-CEO CSR behaviour is voluntary.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds by outlining the critical literature streams of voluntary 
and mandatory CSR, before sharing the conceptual model and proposition development. This 
is followed by the methodological approach, inclusive of sample selection and CSR construct 
as independent, dependent and control variables. In the latter sections of this paper, the 
findings, discussion and conclusion focus on enabling ownership conditions for enhancing 
voluntary CSR activities for improving sustainable development. Towards the end of the 
paper, the limitations of the study and need for future research are also shared. 
 
CSR as mandatory and voluntary theoretical construct 
Whilst CSR as aboard agenda is influenced by ownership structure (Ciulla, 1999; Weaver et 
al., 1999; Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2015;Galbreath,2017) its relationship as a corporate 
governance mechanism influencing board performance remains ambiguous. Former research 
(Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999) has 
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commonly examined different variable mechanism implications simultaneously (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996) and in isolation i.e. non-executive directors’ ownership; executive directors’ 
ownership; institutional ownership etc. Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) argue that 
interdependence among various corporate governance mechanisms (Rediker and Seth, 1995) 
is itself one of the grounds for this ambiguity. 
 
Table 1 below summarises the divergence in interpretations of the existing influential 
representative literature streams, particularly of the dimensional constructs of Mandatory and 
Voluntary CSR threads. The distinction between Mandatory and Voluntary follows Arora and 
Dharwadkhar (2011), where the development of these constructs can be understood over 
time: 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In Table 1 above, the earlier conceptualisations of CSR emphasised the voluntary obligations 
of executives to behave and reflect the acceptable values of society, as a condition of their 
professional legitimacy. Meanwhile, the institutional concern supported growth of 
corporations, whereas economics dominated the rhetoric of ethics. In the1980s, the 
weakening of CSR as a stakeholder concern represented a transition towards greater emphasis 
on institutional intervention and State responsibility i.e. mandatory. By the 1990s, CSR had 
become a collection of different performance measures that clearly differentiated between the 
mandatory and voluntary concerns, but in an internationalising marketplace. In the twentieth 
century, a rise of interconnected social and environmental priorities has focused attention on 
discrete features between ownership (institution, board, individual shareholder) and 
managerial demands of the extended supply chains and the local impact of business, relative 
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to national and industry regulations, or the lack of them. What emerges in the second decade 
of 21st century is CSR as having different combinations of mandatory and voluntary (Arora 
and Dharwadkar, 2011;Lund‐Thomsen, P. and Nadvi, K., 2010)meanings to the advanced 
(monitoring and institutional led) and developing (protecting the power base whilst reforming 
towards advanced nation demands) markets. As such, this study is located amidst pressures of 
globalisation (Kakabadse and Khan, 2016) in which governments are weakened and 
corporations are able to more choose where and how they operate (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2007: 1101). 
 
The growing consensus followed here, is that voluntary (sustainable development practices; 
committed employment; philanthropy) and mandatory (meeting of minimum regulations; 
health and safety; human rights) CSR is better examined separately (Strike et al., 2006; 
Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Godfrey et al., 2009; Chiu and Sharfman, 2009; Arora and 
Dharwadkar, 2011).Furthermore, where 'firms cannot be trusted to behave completely 
ethically on their own' (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011: 14), this study contributes to a gap in 
the field, in understanding the impact of corporate ownership structures, particularly on the 
board (Galbreath, 2017) as CEO and non-CEO prompts and prevention, as influential on 
voluntary CSR. 
 
Typically, profit-focused corporations are more likely to engage in voluntary CSR when they 
perform economically well (O’Rourke, 2003, Waddock and Graves, 1997).In this study, firm 
performance is incorporated into the conceptual model, as attainment discrepancy and 
organisational slack1, underpinned by the behavioural theory of the firm2 (Cyert and March, 
                                                          
1 For literature threads to Attainment and Organisational Slack see Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) Appendix 1 pg14. 
2Most decisions concerning long-term investments within organizations, including voluntary corporate social programmes, 
are subject to unresolved conflict between coalition of stakeholders (Cyert and March, 1963). 
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1963; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011).Attainment discrepancy is the difference between actual 
and desired performance3. It is suggested that when a corporate firm is perceived to be 
performing well, non-executive directors or institutional owners may feel that there is no 
need for close monitoring, and are more likely to place a greater trust in management 
decision-making. Furthermore, it is likely that management will deal with their monitors, in 
such circumstances, in a more confident manner. Conversely, when a corporation is 
perceived to be not performing well, management may lack decision-making freedoms e.g. 
U.K. banks in the 2007/8 financial crisis (U.K. Corporate Governance Code, 2010; Shin, 
2009). Following this thinking, we build a parallel argument about the additional behavioural 
theory of the Firm feature, the term slack and how it relates to governance response regarding 
their engagement in voluntary CSR. 
 
Ownership structure 
Effective corporate governance, that promotes monitoring, is positively associated with 
stringent mandatory CSR, where failure to comply with rules or standard regulations that can 
result in penalties or erosion of corporate reputation, is avoidable. But, this lens restricts 
voluntary CSR to a simple cost-benefit analysis (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
 
A little closer to reality, the voluntary CSR lens associates effective governance with a 
greater degree of uncertainty where investment interest and potential benefit is preferred by 
those with a longer-term horizon (Jamali et al., 2008). When governance mechanisms focus 
on short term performance e.g. institutional owners demand short term returns (Neubaum and 
Zahra, 19964), this conflicts with and prevents managerial voluntary CSR investment options 
                                                          
3 That can be industry comparative or organisational own targets. 
4 Study sample drawn from Fortune 500, America's largest corporations. 
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(Bushee, 1998). The institutional owner may be perceived as passive (Pound, 1992; Wahal, 
1996; Edwards and Hubbard, 2000) or having an agenda that determines value as part of a 
diversified portfolio (Dharwadkar et al., 2008) as impact on voluntary CSR. 
 
Our study sample is drawn from the FTSE4Good U.K.index (2001) consisting of major U.K. 
companies, which are dominated by institutional investors owning up to 75 per cent of the 
stock. Whilst fifty elite institutions act as the core controlling shareholders (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2001), it remains worthwhile investigating the impact of such dominant 
concentrated ownership on voluntary CSR. These U.K. companies earn retained trading 
profits that amount to more than the share issue and borrowings combined, representing 
overwhelmingly, the largest source of new financial investments for U.K.innovation and 
development (McLaney and Atrill, 2010). However, unlike institutional investors of 
American companies (Neubaum and Zahra, 1996; Porter and Kramer 2006, 2011),the criteria 
of our FTSE4Good U.K. sample leans in support of the longer term horizon, where the 
decision to invest by institution pays more attention to voluntary CSR as a means of 
obtaining competitive position. 
 
 Proposition P1: A greater percentage of institutional ownership has a positive  
   relationship with voluntary CSR. 
 
Considering the board, a greater number of Non-CEOs are associated with an attention to and 
legitimacy within, the external marketplace (Pfeffer and Salancik,1978). But where the 
majority owners in our sample are institutional investors (Oh et al., 2011), they may influence 
the appointment of Non-CEOs to protect their interests, inclusive of longer term 
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sustainability, supported by the U.K. stock exchange listing regulations. As such, we propose 
a greater shareholdings’ percentage of Non-CEOs will increase voluntary CSR engagement. 
 
 Proposition P2: Increase in the ownership stakes of Non-CEOs is positively 
   associated with voluntary CSR. 
 
In this study, corporate board structure includes managerial ownership. Although CEO tenure 
and incentivisation (Rajan and Zingales,2000;Kakabadse et al., 2001),such as share options 
and bonus schemes (Core, et al., 2001; Murphy, 1999)has received much scholarly (Florakis 
and Balafas, 2014) and regulatory (U.K. corporate governance code, 2012) attention, there 
remains a gap for the holistic understanding of U.K. based CEOs ownership structures as 
influential to the promotion of voluntary CSR. 
 
A major literature stream asserts that compensation serves for executive alignment with 
longer term shareholder interests (Gabaix and Landier 2008, Kaplan, 2008, Kaplan and Rauh, 
2010). Others argue that managerial power may complicate the agency problem (Yermack, 
1997, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Past performance has 
been understood as signalling CEO ability, whilst in the post financial crisis (2008) era, the 
focus has been on tying executive share option schemes to the longer term future growth of 
the firm (Grout and Zalewska, 2012).Where management act in opposition to their 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishney, 1997) self-interest and shorter-time horizons can 
adversely affect voluntary CSR (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). We propose CEO ownership 
has a negative impact on voluntary CSR. 
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 Proposition P3: Increase in CEO ownership stake in the firm is negatively associated
   with voluntary CSR. 
 
Satisfaction with firm performance 
In this study both features of BTOF (Cyert and March, 1963) that are attainment discrepancy 
and organizational slack are included as impacts on voluntary CSR. 
 
Attainment discrepancy is an 'indication for firm performance' (Lant,1992: p.624). It is the 
difference between aspired and actual performance, where ‘positive’ refers to exceeding 
expectations and ‘negative’ represents under-performance. The concept has vital implications 
for long-term decisions such as investing in voluntary CSR. Positive attainment discrepancy 
makes firm governance feel confident and think broadly about sustainability. Where 
achieved, shareholders are likely to repose greater trust in management's decisions and permit 
higher discretion in financial allocation for longer term investment (Arora and Dharwadkar, 
2011). Contrastingly, in the case of negative attainment discrepancy, governance will focus 
on improving performance by cutting corners, including CSR investment or cost reduction. 
This leads to limitation of managerial discretion as shareholding owners are not satisfied with 
their decision making (Bromiley et al., 2001).Therefore, we propose that positive attainment 
discrepancy is positively associated with voluntary CSR. 
 
 Proposition P4: High attainment discrepancy is positively associated with voluntary 
   CSR. 
 
Organizational slack is able to signify the existence of actual and potential resources which 
are needed for internal and external necessities for strategic development (Bourgeois, 1981). 
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This availability enables organizations to commit to social causes (Waddock and Graves, 
1997) as well as to respond to stakeholders’ demands (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
 
Some researchers (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Amato and Amato, 2007) have used financial 
performance as a proxy for organisational slack to examine CSR’s level of engagement. This 
has resulted in contradictory findings (Nohria and Gulati, 1996) and is unclear as 
performance (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). It is recommended to distinguish between high 
(uncommitted liquid funds) and low discretion (absorbed costs) constituents of slack 
(Navarro, 1988; Seifert et al., 2004; Arora, 2008; Arora and Dharwadkhar, 2011) where only 
high discretionary slack (Potential) should be used in investigating CSR, as absorbed costs 
are harder / unlikely to be recoverable. 
 
Navarro, 1988; Seifert et al., 2004; and Arora and Dharwadkar., 2011; use only high 
discretionary measures as a proxy for slack to investigate levels of CSR. Navarro (1988) 
measures' potential slack 'as debt/equity ratio. Higher debt-to-equity ratio indicates greater 
financial risk, whereas the lack of liquidity will encourage governance to focus on 
minimizing allocation of resources to voluntary CSR. Therefore, we propose that high 
organizational 'potential slack' is negatively associated with voluntary CSR. 
 
 Proposition P5: Potential organisational slack is negatively associated with  
   voluntary CSR. 
 
The integrated voluntary CSR model 
The impact of corporate governance on CSR is dependent on satisfactory firm performance 
(Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). Satisfaction focuses attention on relative firm performance 
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(attainment) and the availability of resources (slack) that have an impact on the shareholder’s 
decision pertaining to voluntary CSR. Hence there is the need for an integrated model. Figure 
1 below has been developed from the literature. It offers for the first time, a U.K. perspective 
in the understanding of how does ownership structure impact voluntary C.S.R. with 
moderation of firm performance satisfaction. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Our propositions drawn from the literature, asserts that higher institutional and Non-CEO 
ownership, the majority of which is institutional shareholdings, has a more positive impact on 
voluntary CSR, under the condition of low slack (low leverage; low debt to equity ratio) and 
positive attainment discrepancy. Furthermore, the decrease of CEO shareholdings has less of 
a negative impact on voluntary CSR under the same conditions. Hence, 
 
Proposition P6: An increase of Non-CEO shareholdings has a more positive impact  
on voluntary CSR under conditions of low slack and positive 
attainment discrepancy. 
  
Proposition P7: An increase of institutional shareholdings has a more positive impact 
   on voluntary CSR under conditions of low slack and positive  
   attainment discrepancy. 
 
 Proposition P8: An increase of CEO shareholdings has a less negative impact on  
   voluntary CSR under conditions of low slack and positive attainment 
   discrepancy. 
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Table 2 below, summarises our eight propositions relating to voluntary CSR in this study: 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Study sample and approach 
This is a quantitative deductive research (Blaikie, 2000), designed to investigate the impact of 
ownership structure on voluntary CSR in the U.K. Fifty companies consistently listed in the 
FTSE4Good U.K. index during the period 2008-2012 represent the filtered study sample for 
the research question. FTSE4Good U.K. is part of the FTSE4Good index series, that was 
established to objectively assess the ethical behaviour of firms towards meeting globally 
recognised corporate social standards (FTSE, 2012). Whilst the original list constitutes 
between 250 and 280 companies, out of these, only 50 firms remain listed for the full period 
under investigation (2008-2012). These 50 companies emerge from across various industries, 
as identified in Table 3 below: 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Social performance ratings for all the firms in our sample were collected for the period 2008-
2012,in order to investigate CSR engagement during and after the U.K. recession. 
 
In our study, the independent variables predate the dependent variable (Voluntary CSR) - a 
lag of one year (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011).As such, the independent variables data 
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collection was for the period 2007-20115. Data of CEOs ownership, Non-CEOs ownership, 
and concentrated ownership was collected from the annual publicly published reports. 
 
Initially, the data collection was proposed using the Morningstar Company Intelligence 
database (formerly Hemscott Company Guru).This contains information on 300,000 British 
companies including their financial; share price; board of directors’; director shareholdings, 
remuneration, and tenure details. However, this resource was found to be less reliable for our 
longitudinal study i.e. it only provides a snapshot at a particular point in time, whereas we 
needed a continuous, consistent dataset for 2008-2012.Therefore, we engaged annual reports 
as substitutes despite this approach being more time consuming. Global Business Browser 
and BITC (Business in the Community) were additional sources for our data. 
 
Dependent variable 
This study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on CSR. The sample was 
deliberately drawn from FTSE4Good U.K. Index, thereby the firms listed met the minimum 
rules and standards for mandatory CSR, which was therefore not under consideration. The 
dependent variable was voluntary CSR. 
 
CSR indices and data sources 
Archival ratings have been used as dependent CSR variables by the majority of U.S. studies 
typically engaging KLD6 ratings (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). Oh et al., (2011) use 
KEJI7Index, Prado-Lorenzo et al., (2009) engage GRI dataset, whilst Ghazali and Nazli 
(2007) use a CSR disclosure checklist applied to companies on the Bursa Malaysian 
                                                          
5See table 4 below. 
6 Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) ratings 
7 Korea Economic Justice Institute (KEJI) 
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Composite Index. Typical major social performance indicators have included categories such 
as governance and transparency, employee issues, diversity, human rights, product quality, 
environment, community relations, amongst others. Thus, CSR dimensions have a history of 
being formulated into composite indices or comparative ratings (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Hillman and Keim, 2001; Bloom and Hillman, 2007). 
 
More recently, the growing consensus alerts CSR itself is a composite of voluntary (proactive 
stakeholder relationship management) and mandatory (violation of regulations and standards) 
parts, that should be examined separately. One consideration is that the KLD construct is 
mainly focused on corporate philanthropy, gender and racial diversity, good union relations, 
green products or processes, and innovation. These parts are not on the same continuum with 
issues regarding the violations of the regulations set by agencies (Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEO); Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA);Environment Protection Agency(EPA); Fair Trade Commission (FTC)) and in this 
thinking, should not be combined (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). With the aid of such 
exploratory findings, voluntary CSR was examined in this study, as separate to mandatory. 
Thereby our sample was intentionally drawn from the FTSE4Good U.K. index. 
 
BITC (Business in the Community) was found to be the most useful data source of CSR 
ratings for our study. It charts the activities of 117 U.K. companies as impacting local 
communities and philanthropic impacts reported within Corporate Responsibility (CR) index8 
(FT, 2010). The CR index (2015) has become the leading U.K. voluntary benchmark for 
responsible business. The CR Index (2012) rates performance as four bands: Platinum (lists 
companies scored ≥ 95%); Gold (lists firms scored ≥ 90%); Silver (lists companies scored ≥ 
                                                          
8http://www.bitc.org.uk/services/benchmarking/cr-index 
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80%); and Bronze (lists firms scored ≥ 70%). In this study, CSR involvement, taken from the 
CR index (2008-2012) classified companies into five groups (Table 4 below) ranking them 
from 4 to zero. Platinum (4) indicated the highest and Not rated (0) was the lowest possible 
score; Table 4below shares the CSR ranking classifications adopted in this study: 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
In the next section, the independent and control variables are shared. 
Independent and Control variables 
The independent and control variables are identified in Table 5below. Each variable is 
supported by previous literature studies, and the measure in consideration of this study: 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Ownership structure (financial independent variable) 
In order to identify the relationships between ownership structure and CSR ratings, three 
approaches were adopted. Firstly, concentrated ownership (Figure 1 above) may be the most 
effective mechanism of corporate governance, as financial institutions have more incentives 
and more means to monitor this performance (Morck et al., 1988; Kang and Sorensen, 1999; 
Hoskisson et al., 2002). To test propositions P3 and P8 (Figure 1 and Table 1 above), all 
institutions that owned 3 per cent or more shares in a firm (Table 4 measure above) were 
considered. The greater the ownership percentage by institution, the more likely it will be 
incentivised to monitor firm performance (Laidroo, 2009). According to the Financial 
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Services Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules (FSA’s DTRs, 2012), companies are 
required to disclose all institutional shareholdings of 3 per cent and above. 
 
Secondly, CEO stock ownership has a significant, positive impact on enhancing mandatory 
CSR (Mitra and Hossain, 2011). However, with regards to voluntary CSR, evidence suggests 
that the CEO acts in opposite favour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). To test this propositions P1 
and P6 (Figure 1 and Table 1 above), empirically tested CEO shareholdings, where CEO 
ownership was the percentage of total equity owned by CEO (Chen, 2008). 
 
Thirdly, existing literature (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007) 
asserts that the greater representation of Non-CEOs provides better governance and enhances 
seeking external legitimacy for the corporation. Thus, as a mean of identifying the impact of 
Non-CEOs ownership on voluntary CSR, the propositions P2 and P6 (Table 1 and Figure 1 
above) examine shareholdings of Non-CEOs as an ownership variable. Non-CEOs were those 
directors that neither worked for nor were affiliated in any other way to the company 
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) beyond this role. 
 
Attainment discrepancy (independent variable) 
To calculate attainment discrepancy in financial performance, return on assets (ROA) was 
calculated and used as an accounting measure of performance. This follows the approach in 
previous studies (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
 
After calculating the ROA, following Bromiley, (1991) and Arora and Dharwadkar, (2011), 
attainment discrepancy was measured against the industry average as a benchmark. For 
companies that performed above the benchmark, their past performances were multiplied by 
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1.05 (5% increase) and the historical difference between industry and firm actual 
performance was represented as attainment discrepancy. Positive attainment discrepancy 
signified actual performance above aspired (industry) and conversely, in the case of negative 
discrepancy. In the case of exceeding aspired performance, we expect that high attainment 
discrepancy is positively associated with voluntary CSR and as such, we include this variable 
to test proposition P4 (Table 1 and Figure 1 above) in our conceptual model. 
 
Organisational potential slack (independent variable) 
Different to Amato and Amato's (2007) use of financial performance to measure total slack, 
in this study the debt-to-equity ratio was adopted to measure 'potential' slack (Navarro, 1988; 
Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). However, we believe that high debt-to-equity ratio is 
negatively associated with long-term investments such as voluntary CSR. To test this, 
proposition P5, (Table 1 and Figure 1 above) was included in our conceptual model. 
 
Control variables 
This study adopted an appropriate methodology that allowed the examination of a multi-
dimensional ownership structure of endogenous and controlling variables. The control 
variables in this study were firm industry, firm size, board size, CEO age, gender and tenure – 
those factors that have been controlled in earlier studies (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
 
Firm-industry (control variable) 
There are diversified social responsibility practices across different industries (Bowman and 
Haire, 1975; Spencer and Taylor, 1987; Griffin and Mahon, 1997). Heavy manufacturing and 
chemical industries are criticised for being major pollution culprits (Cole et al., 2005; Kneller 
and Mandersen, 2012); innovation fosters firm rise and decline within industry e.g. record, 
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cassette, CD, digital storage formats in the music industry; whilst regulations and their 
enforcement may drive changes in certain sectors more than others e.g. recycling, packaging, 
the health or car industry. Main stream studies (Ullman, 1985; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) 
have argued that Firm-industry is a factor that affects both firm performance and CSR. As 
such, empirical studies need to redirect the relationship between social and financial 
performance, where Firm-industry variable should be controlled for(Margolis et al., 
2007).The industry classifications of Waddock and Graves (1997) has been engaged by 
scholars (Tsoutsoura, 2004; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) to control varied industrial 
munificence. In this U.K. study, rather than scholarly segmentation (Waddock and Graves, 
1997), the Standard Industry Classification code (SIC) is engaged, that is, widely accepted 
and provided by U.K. Office for National Statistics. 
 
Firm-size (control variable) 
Previous literatures (Ullman, 1985; Burke et al., 1986; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) suggest 
that firm-size as a factor, affects firm performance including CSR and it should be controlled 
for. Moreover, firm-size has received more attention where there is a greater pressure on 
larger firms to respond to the stakeholders' demands for responsibility (Burke et al., 1986). 
The majority of earlier studies that engage 'total assets' to measure firm-size are criticised, as 
this can cause statistical multicollinearity (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). In this study, we 
follow the guidance to use employees' number to represent firm-size measure, which avoids 
such statistical problem without loss of information. Furthermore, as Firm-size can be skewed 
and may violate the assumption of normality (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011), therefore, in this 
study, the control variable has been log transformed. 
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CEO age and tenure (control variable) 
CEO age (McKnight et al., 2000) and tenure (Rejchrt and Higgs, 2014) reflect a need for 
experience and maturity in leadership decision-making (Korac-Kakabadse et al., 2002), that 
reflects balance of CEO power and their own accountability (Kakabadse and Van den Bergh, 
2013) for strategic development, particularly in high discretion environments (Kakabadse, 
2015; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick et al., 1993). As such, this study controlled for CEO age and 
tenure. 
 
Board size and gender (control variable) 
Influential to the implications of CEO's decision power, earlier studies (Yermack, 1997; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Brammer et al., 2007; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Fernandez-
Feijoo, et al., 2012; Alexandrina, 2013; Oba and Fodio, 2013) found that board size and 
gender have an impact and therefore we controlled for these in our study. 
 
In the next section, the panel data approach adopted for analysis in this study is shared. 
 
Panel data analysis 
In order to avoid the biases and misleading estimates that come from traditional cross-
sectional studies (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).this study employs panel data - the random 
effects model for analysis. The use of a longitudinal methodology enables this study to isolate 
the effects of specific actions and treatments over time and across sections (Hill and Phan, 
1991; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). In this study, the methodology is adopted to allow for 
the examining of the multi-dimensional ownership construct in respect of the endogenous 
variables and taking account of the controlling variables. 
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In support of lagging the data, Hambrick (2007) asserts that when researchers include 
temporal lags and controls for the historical or prior states of variables, this will support the 
empirical establishment of causality mechanisms, closer to reality. In consideration of 
generalisation of findings, Maddala (2002) prefers the use of Random effects model. 
 
The Voluntary CSR Random-effects regression model 
The Random-Effects regression approach is most effective to use when the variables of 
interest for each firm are constant (Dougherty, 2006). The group of firms under consideration 
is a random sample rather than full population (fixed) and the individual specific effects are 
uncorrelated (Barter, 2017; Schmidheiney, 2016). In this case, the random-effects model is 
most appropriate for generalising the findings that go beyond the studied samples (Maddala, 
2002). Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis is employed using Hausman-Taylor panel data 
regression for endogenous covariates (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) - among CG, CSR and 
other variables used as a measure for firm performance. The equation below outlines the 
modelling in our study: 
 
VolCSRi,t = β0 + β1CEOOWNi,t-1 + β2Non-CEOOwni,t-1 + β3InstOwni,t-1 +  β4AttainDisci,t-1 + 
β5OrgSlacki,t-1 + β6FSizei,t-1 + β7DFIi + β8CEDAgei,t-1 + β9Tenurei,t-1 + β10BoardSizei,t-1 + 
β11Genderi,t-1+ αi + δt + εi,t 
 
VolCSRis the dependent variable(Voluntary CSR). CEOOWN, Non-CEOOwn, InstOwn, 
AttainDisc, OrgSlack, FSize, DFI, CEDAge, Tenure, BoardSize, and Gender are the observed 
independent variables (CEOs Ownership, Non-CEOs Ownership, Institutional Ownership, 
Attainment Discrepancy, Organisational Slack, Firm Size, Dummy variables for Firm 
Industry, CEO Age, CEO Tenure, Board Size, and Board Gender respectively). αi is the 
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unobserved effect on the depending variable; β0is the intercept or constant, and the point at 
which the regression line cuts the vertical axis. β1,β2,β3,β4, β5,β6,β7,β8,β9,β10, andβ11 are the 
non-standardised regression coefficients. The index i refers to the unit of observation (the 
study sample of 50 firms), t refers to the time period (2008-2012), and εi,t is a disturbance 
term assumed to satisfy the usual regression model conditions. 
 
A trend term t has been introduced to allow for a shift of the intercept over time. If the 
implicit assumption of a constant rate of change seems too strong, the trend can be replaced 
by a set of dummy variables, one for each time period, except for the reference period 
(Dougherty, 2006). 
 
Study Findings 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations are reported in Table 6, below. The mean 
value for voluntary CSR is 1.607 with a standard deviation of 1.783. Voluntary CSR is 
correlated with CEO ownership, Non-CEO ownership, Institutional ownership, attainment 
discrepancy, organizational slack, firm size, CEO age, CEO tenure, board size and gender at 
p < .05: 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Where findings may be of concern due to potential multicollinearity between the variables, 
our regression analysis (Table 7 below) indicates no such concern, as our VIF is close to 1 
(Burns and Burns, 2008). The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistically describes the level 
of multicollinearity, the correlation between predictors, that exists in regression analysis. If 
VIF = 1, the status of predictors is not correlated; if 1 < VIF < 5, predictors are moderately 
correlated; and if VIF > 5 then there is high correlation. The VIF statistic in our study is well 
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below 5 and very close to 1, hence indicating no multicollinearity problem (Burns and Burns, 
2008). 
 
Findings of the random effect regression model on standardized (normalized) variables for 
the period 2008-2012, are reported in Table 7below. The firms with higher Non-CEO 
ownerships, higher percentages of institutional ownerships, higher attainment discrepancy, 
larger size and gender diversity, with more women sitting on their boards, are more likely to 
invest in Voluntary CSR. Contrastingly, firms with higher CEO ownership percentages and 
greater debt to equity ratios, are less likely to engage in Voluntary CSR. These are interesting 
results which further studies may like to explore in more detail. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
The findings in Tables 6 reject a null hypothesis. There is sufficient statistical evidence to 
conclude significant linear relationships. Table 7 indicates that shareholdings’ percentage of 
CEOs has a significant, negative, linear relationship with voluntary CSR (proposition 3). Together 
these findings suggest opportunities for a better balance which could be reached via  more diverse 
ownership (as suggested by proposition 1 & 2).  Whilst employee corporate ownership or their board 
representation has been debated, it remains suppressed by existing board-level stakeholders. 
Meanwhile, we note that issues in public-private arrangements (e.g. Carrilion) remain and the tax-
payer funded bail outs as ownership (e.g. RBS 2007/8) may serve more political purpose than 
individual shareholder losses9. The findings assert executive ownership alone may not be the 
solution to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Executive directors 
                                                          
9 £60bn losses over 10 years – RBS first profit in 2017/18 announced. 
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are hired by the principals (shareholders), mainly to protect their interests and may, therefore, 
endeavour to eliminate philanthropic or other CSR activities (Coffrey and Wang, 1998).Furthermore,  
directors are hired mainly for their financial experience (Fligstein, 1991) and prefer to evaluate 
historical financial information rather than investing in uncertain, long-term activities such as 
entrepreneurship, innovation, research and development, and investing in the community (e.g. 
investing in voluntary CSR) (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Deutsch, 
2005).  The above findings are analysed next in relation to the 8 propositions that were being 
tested in the conceptual model. 
 
Analysis of the Voluntary CSR propositions 
The results demonstrate a strong support for our propositions (Table 1 above). Proposition 3 
predicted that the increase of CEOs ownership has a negative impact on Voluntary CSR. The 
regression analysis (Table 7 above) reveals that high CEO ownerships (β = -.058) has a 
significant negative impact on the levels of Voluntary CSR. Proposition 8 predicted that an 
increase in CEO shareholdings has less of a negative impact on Voluntary CSR, under 
conditions of low debt to equity ratio and high attainment discrepancy. Our statistical model 
that integrates CEO shareholdings as an element of ownership structure and behavioural 
theories, in order to examine the interaction effects over time (2008-2012) -see regression 
results in table 7above, strongly supports this prediction. 
Proposition 2 predicted that the increase of Non-CEO ownerships has a positive impact on 
Voluntary CSR. Table 7 reveals that high Non-CEO ownerships (β = .010) has a highly 
significant impact on the levels of Voluntary CSR. Our finding here contradict studies that 
find a negative relationship between CSR and non-CEO ownership ((Kesner and Johnson, 
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1990; Wang and Coffey, 1992; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). Similarly, Proposition 1 predicted 
that the greater percentage of institutional ownership has a positive impact on Voluntary 
CSR. It is revealed in the regression analysis (Table 7 above) that high institutional 
ownership (β = .013) has a highly significant relationship with Voluntary CSR. 
Propositions 6 and 7 predicted that an increase of Non-CEO and institutional shareholdings 
have a more positive impact on Voluntary CSR under conditions of low debt to equity ratio 
and high attainment discrepancy. Our statistical model integrates Non-CEO and institutional 
shareholdings, as the other two elements of ownership structure and behavioural theories, in 
order to test the interactive effects over the period 2008-2012. The results demonstrate a 
strong support for these predictions. 
Proposition 4 predicted that positive attainment discrepancy is associated with Voluntary 
CSR. The results in Table 6 above revealed consistency with this prediction. Attainment 
discrepancy (β = .021) using return on assets as the accounting measure, is highly 
significantly associated with Voluntary CSR. 
Proposition 5 predicted that 'potential slack' is negatively associated with Voluntary CSR. 
The results show that potential slack (β = -.065) represented by debt,-to-equity ratio, is highly 
negatively associated with Voluntary CSR. 
The results show that diversity board characteristics (gender) (β = .310) are significantly 
associated with Voluntary CSR. Board gender has a positive and significant, linear 
relationship with voluntary CSR. These results support the theory which suggests that female 
directors are atleast twice as likely as male directors to be highly qualified (hold a doctoral 
degree), have gained a broader experience within smaller firms and bring with them diverse 
Page 26 of 41 
 
perspectives to the board (Hillman et al., 2002).However, CEO age, board size and tenure did 
not reveal statistically significant findings. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The aim of this study was to understand the impact of ownership structures on corporate 
social responsibility of U.K. firms during government emergent austerity conditions of 2008-
2012. As such our ownership structure in conceptual modelling (Figure 1 above) took 
account of institutional concentration along with Board member ownerships as CEO and non-
CEO. Our conceptual model included satisfaction with firm performance, which supported by 
behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) constituted attainment discrepancy 
and slack. Following Arora and Dharwadkar (2011), our understanding of CSR distinguished 
between mandatory and voluntary parts of CSR. Where all our sample was taken from U.K. 
FTSE4Good index, the mandatory CSR conditions were met and our 8 propositions could test 
How does ownership structure impact corporate social responsibility? for governance 
mechanisms /conditions beneficial for the enhancing of Voluntary CSR, as critical to 
sustainable development. 
 
Our preferred approach engaged Random-effects regression to the panel data of U.K. firms 
during 2008-2012. In our conceptual model the dependent variable was Voluntary CSR and 
we controlled for firm-industry, firm-size, board size, CEO age, gender and tenure. 
 
Our results indicate that increasing institutional and Non-CEOs shareholdings fosters a higher 
level of Voluntary CSR engagements. In the U.K. institutions have high shareholdings and 
may appoint Non-CEOs to represent their views and closely monitor their investments. Thus, 
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there is the need for widening of stakeholders power to affect social sustainability, or more 
independent Non-CEO shareholdings that may support higher Voluntary CSR accountability. 
Contrastingly, an increase of CEO shareholdings as concentrated power leads to lower level 
of investment in Voluntary CSR. This brings attention to a need for re-orientating or 
broadening the motivations and ethical mind-set of the organisational leader (CEO) in the 
case of benefits of Voluntary CSR during government led austerity periods. Alternatively, 
government policy or regulation should greater incentivise voluntary CSR in such periods. 
Ajmal et al. (2017) most recently identify that economic and environmental firm 
sustainability can be driven together through social factors within the organization. The firm 
leader’s motivations and perspective influences strategic alignment and impact of sustainable 
development outcomes. 
 
Our findings suggest that positive attainment discrepancy leads to a higher level of Voluntary 
CSR engagement, and potential slack leads to a lower level of Voluntary CSR investment. 
Our findings imply an association of effective governance with Voluntary CSR relies on the 
level of attainment discrepancy and organisational slack. That is, the impact of effective 
governance on Voluntary CSR is more pronounced under conditions of greater attainment 
discrepancy (higher return on assets) and lower organizational slack (lower debt to equity 
ratio). We note here the longer term shift in the U.K. towards neo-liberalism that whilst 
enabling potential availability for established firms to raise finance, also promotes a higher 
risk of debt culture, which may have a psychological impact on organisational leaders. Under  
government austerity conditions, firm is less likely to equitably prioritise environmental and 
social factors above economic. Yet, the environmental mitigation and social impacts become 
more important (Ajmal et al. 2017). Looking ahead, at the potential impacts of Brexit – the 
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U.K.’s exit from the European Union are unclear and will impact CSR policy and firm 
decision making as sustainable development. 
 
In this paper we have presented the case of CSR as  a voluntary and mandatory construct. In 
our modelling, whilst distinguishing between the two, we assert a complimentary rather than 
substitution relationship. However, we argue that the substitution effect can be evident during 
most stable or post-crisis periods, in cases where regulation may lead to change or prevent 
known problems from reoccurring. In reality, voluntary CSR leads to mandatory CSR and is 
therefore more important, because there is a time lag and because there are differences 
between the practice and reporting of CSR. The need for discretionary capacity becomes 
more critical in handling uncertainty during periods of austerity. Mandatory CSR emerges 
from the learning of Voluntary CSR and then it becomes a requirement for firms in industry 
to comply with as standards of acceptance. There may be opportunity for more pro-active 
governance in shaping firm outcomes. This is an interesting discussion that will benefit from 
case studies and contributions. 
 
Further studies may like to explore our results and findings in more detail. There seems to be 
an opportunity for understanding CEO behaviours towards Voluntary CSR; How could the 
current typical board structure of large U.K. firms make better use of Non-CEO 
contributions? Would broadening ownership concentration or Board structure enhance 
Voluntary CSR? Where the U.K. State prefers voluntary ‘comply or explain’ for business, 
what effects are legislation or industry standards, as mandatory, having on Voluntary CSR? 
Where CSR is conceptualised as parts of a whole, what does this mean internally at different 
levels of the organisation – grass roots; management; board? And where CSR asserts 
business responsibility to society, how can Voluntary CSR initiatives engage across different 
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industries for greater effect and impacts? (Ajmal et al., 2007). Future studies may consider 
what does the regulator prefer – Voluntary or Mandatory CSR? and How does the 
relationship between Voluntary and Mandatory CSR influence the regulator’s decision? It 
may also be interesting to focus on what powers and remit a regulator has and needs on the 
firm. More broadly, such questions point to what type of governance system does a society 
prefer in terms of shaping the Government, regulator and firm relationship? 
 
This study may also offer support to institutional policy and organisational CSR relational 
studies of other less developed and culturally different national frameworks or contexts (Ali, 
Frynas and Mahmood, 2017; Kilic, Kuzey and Uyar, 2015; Soliman, Din and Sakr, 
2013:Skouloudis and Evangelinos, 2012; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Li and Zhang, 2010; 
MohdGhazali, 2007; Oh, Chang and Martynov, 2011) seeking improved equity and 
alignment of social, environmental and economic factors for eco-sustainable development. 
 
In conclusion, this study highlights how vital it is to integrate firm sustainability performance 
and leverage it in examining the impact of governance on decision making regarding long-
term strategy and in our case, Voluntary CSR in particular. Our study strongly supports the 
need to integrate insights of the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) into 
corporate governance theory for determining CSR engagement (Arora and Dharwadkar, 
2011).Our study has drawn attention to Non-CEOs on Voluntary CSR as key to enabling 
conditions for better CSR engagement. Similarly, the findings call for restricting CEO 
financial incentivising, that do not align with longer term sustainable development strategies 
(such as Voluntary CSR). 
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Limitations 
In spite of a number of methodological improvements to our research design, this study is not 
free of limitations. This study relies on BITC ratings that ranks only 117 U.K. firms in terms 
of philanthropic activities and local community engagements (FT, 2010). Furthermore, those 
companies below 70% were given rating of 0, regardless that they maybe making 
contribution to Voluntary CSR. Thus, our results assume zero rating as non-engagement. Our 
study leans to CSR as positive, where good intentions do not necessarily mean good impact. 
Our study does not consider the potential for negative social impacts of CSR in the 
communities. Further, our selection criteria of sample firms are those that already are 
engaging in some kind of Voluntary CSR pro-actively. We acknowledge our data-set focuses 
on a time-period post-financial crisis emergent in the U.K. and is limited to CSR during 
recession conditions and government austerity programme. 
 
In considering the board, our study only distinguishes between institutional, CEO and Non-
CEOs financially. Future studies may focus in more detail on Board members (Chairman; 
Finance; NEDs) where CEO/Chairman relationship has been much researched. Essentially 
our study was driven by available quality data. There remains scope for better indexes and 
more contextually dynamic CSR and governance for improving longer term equitable 
economic, environmental and social sustainable development. 
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Table 1: Emergent constructs of Mandatory and Voluntary CSR 
Literature streams Voluntary CSR Mandatory CSR 
Barnard (1938) 
Bowen (1948; 1953)  
Professionalization of management - 'social 
responsibility' of executives to meet values 
of society. 
Growth of corporation as a state concern of 
liberalising capitalism. 
Walton (1967); Manne &Wallich (1972); 
Davis (1967; 1973)  
Ethically altruistic, strategic, purely 
voluntary; free agent; as social 
responsibility owed to society 
Ethics as a moral concern for self-interest-
Avoiding societal harm, in strategic 
directing of business conduct 
Drucker (1984); Freeman (1984); Porter 
(1985) 
Extending the direct impacts of corporate 
practice responsibilities relative to impact 
on unique influential stakeholders. 
CSR as a business opportunity; wealth 
creation and competitive advantage as a 
mechanism of power. 
Carroll (1979; 1991; 1999) Ethical as firm discretionary, philanthropic 
and corporate citizenship responsibility. 
Legal, economic - firm has rule designed 
responsibility to society. 
Wood (1991) Corporate social performance as attribute of 
CSR particular to the organisation in 
context. 
Corporate social performance as 
institutional policy mechanism for firm 
direction in society. 
Lantos (2001) Broad Ethics - altruistic, shared strategic. Narrow ethics - as protecting self. 
Crane and Matten (2004), Crane et al. 
(2004), Andriof and McIntosh (2001) 
Civil society demands and needs as 
empathetic concern.  
Business responsibility to State; as a moral 
obligation. Democracy and corporations as 
non-empathetic citizens. 
Naylor, (1999); Fraser, (2005) Obligations of managers to choose and act 
in interests of organisation within society  
Compliance to the demands of others as a 
negotiation with society. 
Waddock et al. (2005) Diversity as opportunity for Corporate 
exploitation  
Universal human rights and citizenship 
Jones et al. (2005) Philanthropic and managerial concern of 
employees and community -workplace as 
extension of community 
Environments as distinct features of the 
marketplace with different obligations. 
Jamali, (2007) Discretionary responsibility as inherent 
concern of self as part of others. 
Ethical, legal, economic components of the 
marketplace. 
Matten and Moon (2008) Implicit - informal values, norms and 
behaviours. National diversity and corporate 
discretions 
Explicit - formal policies. Conformance to 
industry standards and Regional controlling 
regulations. 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2009; 2011)  Board leadership qualities- director motives 
and concerns of CSR as consensus building 
for value. 
CSR as strategic and institutional tailoring 
of the evidence as part of constrained 
governance processes. 
Zile (2011) Broad voluntary value adding business 
initiatives as drivers to meeting the needs of 
emerging markets. 
Government / State / Acts driven CSR 
designed agendas as best interest - requiring 
project funding in developing countries.  
Gamerschlag et al. 2011 Declining financial returns forcing need for 
policy change and renewed innovation of 
new markets demands. 
Political cost and benefits ; political bottom 
line implications as renewal of closed 
networks. 
Hung, Shi and Wang (2013)  Informal business practices, discrete 
lobbying as shaping the agenda as proactive. 
Reported CSR information in China. 
Government setting standards and crafting 
of evidence mindful of public image. 
Ioannou and Serafeim, (2011; 2014) Individual firm practices; bribery and 
corruption. Weakness of consensus building 
in developing countries - call for shared 
engagement as a concern. 
Global sustainability reporting and 
enforcement. Strength of developed 
countries as it politically increases 
responsibilities of business leaders. 
Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) Attainment as above aspired; Organisational 
slack as potential - non-financial 
performance and opportunities. 
Meeting the regulations as conditional to 
conformance - ticking the criteria box. 
Source: Designed by authors (see Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011 for Voluntary and Mandatory CSR construct). 
 
Table 2: Voluntary CSR propositions 
P1- A greater percentage of institutional ownership has a positive relationship with voluntary 
CSR. 
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P2- An increase in the ownership stakes of Non-CEOs in the firm has a positive association 
with voluntary CSR.  
P3- An increase in the ownership stake of the CEO in the firm has a negative association with 
voluntary CSR. 
P4 - High attainment discrepancy is positively associated with voluntary CSR. 
P5 - Potential organisational slack is negatively associated with voluntary CSR. 
P6-An increase of Non-CEO shareholdings has a more positive impact on voluntary CSR 
under conditions of low slack and positive attainment discrepancy. 
P7- An increase of institutional shareholdings has a more positive impact on voluntary CSR 
under conditions of low slack and positive attainment discrepancy. 
P8-An increase of CEO shareholdings has a less negative impact on voluntary CSR under 
conditions of low slack and positive attainment discrepancy. 
Source: designed by authors from the literature informing Figure 1 
 
 
Table 3: Industry sectors FTSE4Good U.K. sample (2008-2012). 
Number of Firms (Total 50 firms) Industry sector (2008-2012) 
9 
5 
5 
2 
3 
5 
2 
5 
2 
5 
2 
5 
Support Services 
Media and entertainment 
Gas; water; multi-utility 
Oil and gas 
Telecoms 
Travel and leisure 
Banking 
Financial services 
Insurance 
Food and drug retailers 
Home furnishing retailers 
General retailers 
 Source: compiled by authors. 
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Table 4 :Voluntary CSR ranking 
CR Index 
Performance 
Band (t) 
Platinum Gold Silver Bronze 
 Firms not 
included in CR 
Index 
Percentage 
(%) 95 and over 90 – 95 80 – 90 70 – 80 Less than 70 
Rank 4 3 2 1 0 
Source: compiled by the authors from CR index 
 
Table 5: Independent and Control variables. 
Independent Variables Literatures Measure 
Ownership structure  
Financial institutions (t-1)  Morck et al., 1988; Kang and 
Sorensen, 1999; Hoskisson et 
al., 2002; Laidroo, 2009; Arora 
andDharwadkar, 2011.  
Total percentage of all 
institutions that own 3 per cent 
or more shares in the firm. 
CEO (t-1) Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; 
Chen (2008); Mitra and 
Hossain, 2011. 
Total percentage of all CEO 
shareholdings. 
Non-CEO (t-1) Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 
2007; Arora andDharwadkar, 
2011. 
Total percentage of all non-
CEO shareholdings. 
Attainment discrepancy(t-1) Bromiley, 1991;Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Dutta et al, 2005; 
Richard et al, 2007;. Arora 
andDharwadkar, 2011. 
Return on Assets ratio (ROA).  
Organisational slack(t-1) Navarro, 1988; Arora 
andDharwadkar, 2011. 
Potential slack is represented by 
debt-to-equity ratio. 
Control variables   
 Literatures Measure 
Firmindustry(t-1) Bowman and Haire, 
1975;Ullman, 1985;Spencer and 
Taylor, 1987; Griffin and 
Mahon, 1997; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001; Tsoutsoura, 
2004;Margolis et al., 2007; 
Arora andDharwadkar, 2011. 
The Herfindhal-Hirschman 
Index; down to two-digit code 
industry level as defined in the 
U.K. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC 2007). 
Provided by the Office for 
national statistics. 
Firmsize(t-1) Ullman, 1985; Burke et al, 
1986; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001; Arora andDharwadkar, 
2011. 
The number of full time 
employees.  
CEOage(t-1) Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick et 
al, 1993; Arora andDharwadkar, 
2011. 
Average age of CEOs and Non-
CEOs. 
CEOtenure(t-1) 
 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Haleblian and 
The average of the number of 
years since CEOs and Non-
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 Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick et 
al, 1993; Arora andDharwadkar, 
2011. 
CEOs were appointed to the 
board.  
Boardsize(t-1) 
 
Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al, 
1998; Alexandrina, 2013. 
The total number of members in 
the board.  
Boardgender(t-1) Dutta and Bose, 2007; 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 
2008;. Oba and Fodio, 2013. 
The ratio of females to males in 
the board. 
 
Source: compiled by the authors 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix 
 
Source: Findings by authors from Figure 1 
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Table 7: Regression results for 2008-2012. 
VolCSR Coef. Outcomes 
Industry dummy coefficients   
CEOOwn -0.058* Significant relationship 
Non-CEOOwn 0.010** Significant relationship 
InsOwn 0.013** Significant relationship 
AttainDiscROA 0.021** Significant relationship 
OrgSlackD/E -0.065* Significant relationship 
FSize 0.796** Significant relationship 
CEOAge 0.066 Insignificant relationship 
Tenure  -0.102 Insignificant relationship 
BSize 0.016 Insignificant relationship 
Gender 0.310* Significant relationship 
R2 0.621  
F significance  51.77***  
No. of observations  250  
Source: findings of authors 
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (β), the value of R2, and the value and significance of the F 
change. The levels of significance are: ***p<.01 **p<.05, *p<.10. Coefficients for dummy industry variables 
not reported for the sake of brevity 
 
Figure 1: Integrated model of Voluntary CSR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by authors 
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